The political dynamics of green transformations: feedback and institutional context by Lockwood, Matthew
1 
 
The Political Dynamics of Green Transformations:  
Feedback Effects and Institutional Context1 
 
Matthew Lockwood 
 
In Ian Scoones, Melissa Leach and Peter Newell (Eds.) The Politics of Ggreen 
Transformations, Earthscan (2015), pp. 86-101 - Corrected copy edit version 
 
Introduction 
 
Why do green transformations in some countries appear to have more momentum than in 
others? As other contributions in this book make clear, there are multiple interpretations of 
what transformations to more sustainable economies and societies might look like. However, 
even with relatively limited and mainstream conceptualizations, such as decarbonization of 
the economy or the growth of renewable energy, there are large variations between countries 
in how far they have progressed over the last two decades. 
 
Whatever form green transformations take, some basic features of their political dynamics 
will be common to all. There are some fairly obvious factors that help determine where such 
transformations are more likely to start – for example the absence of a powerful coal lobby 
(Steves and Teytelboym, 2013) or a more green-minded population (Harrison and Sundstrom, 
2010). However, sustainable transformations are likely to take some time, for example at 
least two or three decades for decarbonizing energy systems and economies. A key corollary 
of this is that successful transformations not only require instigation, but also have to be 
politically sustained for long periods. Coalitions need to be created around a number of 
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different objectives (see Schmitz, chapter 11 and Newell, chapter 5), but they also have to be 
kept together and expanded over time. Eventually, as the costs of more sustainable 
technologies and processes come down, green transformations should become economically 
self-sustaining, led effectively by a new green demand paradigm (Perez, 2013). But until that 
stage is reached, public policy is needed to lead the transformation. Such policy will tend to 
be highly political because it effectively involves a process of creating and managing rents to 
pay for the development of greener products and processes (Schmitz et al, 2013).  
 
In this paper I argue that the sustainability of green transformations depends heavily on the 
political effects of policies aimed at bringing about transformation. These effects in turn 
either strengthen or weaken support for such policies, causing positive or negative feedback 
effects and divergent policy paths. In the political science literature such knock-on effects are 
known as ‘policy feedback’. My focus here is on public policy-making, since this will 
inevitably be needed for large-scale transformations of economies, but I would argue that the 
same set of issues also apply to campaigns and other actions by social movements or civil 
society organizations. Unless they create some form of positive feedback through their 
actions or ideas, such movements and organizations will not be able to lead significant 
transformations. Especially for transformations relating to global sustainability problems 
(including most ‘planetary boundaries’), this dynamic is crucial, since such problems in 
themselves are not seen by the majority of people as sufficiently urgent to prioritise action, or 
pose severe collective action challenges that block change. 
 
The political effects of policies depend in part on how policies are designed. However, both 
policy design and their political consequences will also be affected by the nature of 
underlying institutions and dominant ideas, which vary between countries (Morgan et al, 
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2010). The factors of policy feedback and underlying institutions are likely to play a major 
role in shaping the speed and likely success or failure of transformations, since they help 
determine the political dynamics of transformation. They also point to the possibility of 
trying to accelerate transformations. 
 
Below, I explore these issues through a number of comparative examples, a particularly 
useful approach, since it allows the examination of divergent pathways. I focus on renewable 
energy policy, so it is useful first to briefly consider the political forces and relationships at 
work in the energy sector (section 2). Section 3 then examines the concept of policy 
feedback, and how it can be a useful analytical tool for understanding the dynamics of 
renewable energy policy in Germany, the UK, India and China. Section 4 brings in the role of 
institutional context and revisits the case studies. The chapter concludes with some 
reflections on the approach, its relation to the issue of social justice, and implications for 
accelerating green transformations. 
 
The politics of energy 
 
In modern energy sectors there are broadly three groups of actors that are important for 
political dynamics: energy providers, policy-makers and users of energy (e.g. Scrase and 
Smith, 2009, p710). The relationships between these groups of actors ultimately determine 
investment, technological change and outcomes such as greenhouse gas emissions, all of 
which will have further feedback effects on actors (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Figure 6.1 
Political and economic dynamics in the energy system 
 
 
Source: Lockwood et al (2013) 
 
Energy providers can in principle be of any size, from individuals to multinational 
corporations, and privately or state owned, although in most contexts the politically important 
incumbent actors are large companies. Their investment decisions, especially for new 
technologies, will be shaped heavily by incentives, risks and regulations set by policy-
makers. Once made, these decisions create vested interests that shape the subsequent actions 
of incumbents in energy markets. This is particularly so in the energy sector because 
infrastructures are so long-lived, and so give a heavily path-dependent nature to regimes and 
transitions. However, large energy firms are rarely passive and usually seek to influence 
policy actively through a range of means, including direct lobbying, secondments to 
government, and sitting on technical committees that shape markets, all backed up with the 
threat of investment strikes (Jessop, 1990) or divestment leading to the lights going out. In 
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privatized and liberalized markets, a key objective for incumbents in influencing regulation 
and policy will often be to maintain high costs of and barriers to entry in markets (e.g. Stigler, 
1971), meaning that new and potentially innovative new companies will find it harder to 
enter the energy sector. 
 
However, in addition to being lobbied by energy providers, politicians will also pay attention 
to the relationships they have with energy users, which encompasses both the general public 
and businesses outside of the energy sector. Political elites may also be concerned about 
climate change and want to see change towards low-carbon energy, either because that is 
what the public want, or because of personal conviction. Amongst businesses, large energy-
intensive users tend to lobby strongly against policies that increase energy costs, while other 
businesses may support transitions because they see opportunities for revenue in low-carbon 
products and services and in owning renewable energy assets. This split in views can even 
run within a single company, for example Siemens, which manufactures both wind turbines 
and conventional turbines for coal and gas power plants. 
 
Overall, much of the process by which policy-makers shape the institutions that govern the 
energy system is effectively a balancing act between the perceived interests of energy users 
with those of energy provider incumbents (Peltzman, 1976). This is what makes a sustainable 
energy transition so challenging, because policy-makers have to find some way of managing 
this balance through a process of profound change.  
 
This framework is very general. The actors and relationships in any actual case will depend 
on the institutional context. For example, in many OECD countries, the energy sector has 
been liberalized, and incumbents are large (often multinational) private corporations. In 
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countries like China and India, most energy companies remain state-owned, giving their 
relationships with policy-makers a different quality. There will also be differences in the 
relationship between policy-makers and energy users, determined especially by differences in 
the nature of politics between countries. This can apply even between countries with 
apparently very similar polities. For example, Germany and the UK are both mature 
European democracies, but Germany’s proportional representation electoral system means 
that environmentally-minded voters have enjoyed much stronger political representation 
through its Green Party, whereas in the UK the first-past-the-post system prevents this, and 
the route to influencing policy goes via environmental campaign organizations. In non-
democratic systems, such as China’s, the relationship between political elites and mass 
publics is obviously different again, as political pressure comes not through voting but 
through different kinds of demands from a range of actors, from urban communities 
protesting about pollution, to local governments seeking to maximise economic growth 
(Lampton, 2014). However, even in authoritarian China, ensuring that energy is available at 
an affordable cost will still be a major concern of political elites (e.g. Yuan and Zuo, 2011). 
 
Feedback effects and renewable energy policies 
 
Policy feedback effects 
 
The idea that policies can have political effects is now a well-established idea in political 
science, with a number of applications in areas such as welfare and pensions policy (e.g. 
Béland, 2010). As Skocpol puts it, ‘Policies not only flow from prior institutions and politics; 
they also reshape institutions and politics, making some future developments more likely, and 
hindering the possibilities for others’ (quoted in Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009, p1).  
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In a classic essay on such effects, Pierson (1993) distinguishes a number of potential routes 
for such effects. One is that policies distribute resources and create material incentives, which 
can work to create or strengthen particular social interest groups: ‘Public policies often create 
“spoils” that provide a strong motivation for beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of 
programmatic maintenance or expansion’ (Pierson, 1993, p599). Secondly, policies can also 
transform state capacities and institutions, changing the administrative possibilities for 
government initiatives in the future and affecting later prospects for policy implementation. 
For example, policies that involve the collection or generation of new types of information 
then make possible other kinds of policies dependent on that information. 
 
Most importantly, feedback effects can work via what Pierson calls the ‘mass public’, 
transforming the interests, identity and political participation of large groups of people. For 
example, the introduction of social security in the US created the conditions for the invention 
of a new social category (‘retired people’) and the formation of the politically powerful 
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Another important mass public policy 
feedback effect can occur where a policy induces large numbers of people to make 
commitments or investments that it subsequently becomes ‘both expensive and politically 
perilous’ (Béland, 2010, p575) to reverse, thereby ‘locking in’ the policy decision (see also 
Pierson, 1993, p610).  
 
As well as the allocation of material or political resources, there are also what Pierson calls 
‘interpretive effects’ (1993, p611), where policies may produce ‘cues’ for parts of the 
electorate that ‘help them develop political identities, goals, and strategies’ (ibid, p619). 
Particular policies can become iconic of particular political approaches, and help mobilize 
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support for or opposition to that approach, above and beyond any material effect. Given the 
complexity of modern life, policies can generate ‘focusing events’ or cues for social actors, 
but in that process also ‘heighten the visibility of some social and political connections while 
obscuring others.’ 
 
Much of the policy feedback literature has tended to focus on cases of positive feedback, not 
least because it is in these cases that policies become successfully entrenched. As Pierson 
(2000, p259) notes, positive policy feedback is one of the drivers of increasing returns in 
politics, which by analogy from economics (e.g. Arthur, 1989) creates the lock-in noted 
above. Increasing returns also makes political processes path-dependent, in the sense that 
small details of policy design or institutional context will lead to rapidly diverging paths if 
one involves positive feedback and the other does not. By contrast, negative political 
feedback effects undermine policies and limit their transformative reach (Pierson, 1993, 
p600; Béland, 2010, p575). This is particularly important for understanding the political 
dynamics of attempted green transformations, since such transformations often involve 
additional financial costs and challenges to vested interests, which can quickly create 
opposition.   
 
Overall, whether and how quickly transformation occurs depends on the balance of positive 
and negative effects, whether policies can be amended to improve that balance, or indeed 
whether new and more transformative policies are feasible (Weaver, 2010, p138). Where 
policies have strongly positive feedback effects they become successfully locked in, but 
where there are both potential negative and positive feedbacks there can be a ‘snakes and 
ladders’ pattern whereby what appear to be similar policies can diverge according to which 
feedback effect dominates (Weaver, 2010). 
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These considerations clearly apply to the example of renewable energy raised above. Most 
countries have some kind of support policies for renewable energy, yet in some countries 
these have not gone very far whereas in others they have taken off. It might be argued that 
contrasts are simply due to the extent or generosity of subsidy, but this in itself begs the 
question of how higher levels of subsidy (which are clearly seen in countries like Denmark 
and Germany) are politically sustained. 
 
One factor which might be expected to have an influence on the knock-on effects of policies 
is policy design (Pierson, 1993, Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009). Apparently small differences in 
policy design may lead to quite big differences in who can access the benefits from the 
policy, how those benefits are distributed, what the cost is and who bears that cost. Different 
policy approaches can also have varying interpretive effects, resonating strongly or falling 
flat with existing or new constituencies, and leading to large divergences in political 
sustainability. In the case of renewable energy policy design, a key issue is how different 
designs affect the political dynamics of the energy sector discussed in section 2 above and in 
particular the balance between producers and users. 
 
Germany and the UK 
 
Germany and the UK provide contrasting examples of how policy feedback has produced 
different pathways in the growth of renewable energy. At the start of the 1990s, neither 
Germany nor the UK generated significant amounts of electricity from renewable sources. In 
Germany, policies adopted from 1990 onwards led to rapid sustained growth in renewable 
electricity capacity which actually accelerated after 2000. In the UK, renewable electricity 
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was also eligible for support from around the same time, but growth has been much slower. 
By 2012, total renewable generation in the UK was around 11 per cent of total demand, less 
than half the share in Germany. The growth of renewables has generated negative feedback 
effects in both countries, especially opposition on grounds of cost. But a key difference is that 
Germany’s policy approach created considerable positive feedback effects which are largely 
absent in the UK, leaving the policy there far more politically exposed, and currently in some 
trouble. 
 
The growth of renewables in Germany has undoubtedly benefitted from higher levels of 
environmental awareness and stronger opposition to nuclear power than in the UK. However, 
the nature of the policies adopted in the two countries has also been distinctively different. 
Germany’s policies have offered stable, technology-specific prices to renewable generators 
(fixed prices from 2000), and a guaranteed market. By providing attractive returns with low 
risk and ensuring grid connection (Mitchell et al, 2006), a key aspect of the feed-in tariff was 
that its benefits could be accessed by a range of groups, including farmers, households, 
cooperatives, schools, small businesses and municipalities, rather than large energy 
companies, which were in fact excluded from the policy. The policy supported a range of 
technologies, not only wind but also solar photovoltaics (PV), biomass and anaerobic 
digestion. The fact that conservative farmers in areas such as Bavaria benefitted from the 
policy was particularly important for the keeping Germany’s centre-right political party on 
board.  
 
A coalition of political support for renewable energy rapidly grew through the 1990s 
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2000, p266), created partly by the development of vested interests, 
with 340,000 Germans having invested around €12 billion in renewable energy projects by 
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the early 2000s (Sawin, 2004, p25). There were also political effects that worked via the 
strengthening of interest groups , with an increasing professionalization of renewable energy 
associations, amidst strong support from the Green Party and the Ministry of the Environment 
(Laird and Stefes, 2009). In addition, because renewables policy was linked to industrial 
policy, especially from the late 1990s onwards, employment in factories producing wind 
turbines and solar PV panels created a new constituency in favour of a strong renewables 
policy, especially in the former East Germany.  
 
This wide coalition helped to maintain and strengthen renewables policy; for example, it was 
the involvement of municipalities in the 1990s that prevented the collapse of solar PV 
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006, p266). When the first renewable energy law was threatened by 
legal action by the large utilities in the late 1990s and the Government proposed a reduction 
in feed-in rates, the Green Party mobilized a wide coalition of environmental groups, solar 
industry associations and companies, trades unions and regional politicians to successfully 
oppose the changes (ibid, p265). 
 
Germany’s renewable policy has not been without negative feedback effects. It provoked 
strong opposition from the incumbent energy companies and over time the overall cost to 
energy consumers has grown, despite sharp falls in the prices of wind turbines and solar 
panels. At the same time, some of the employment benefits have evaporated as solar PV 
producers have been undercut by Chinese imports. Nevertheless, despite current debates 
about cost, the growth of renewable energy in Germany looks set to continue to enjoy broad 
support. The main political party opposed to further expansion lost all its seats in the 2013 
Parliamentary elections, and the German government pressed strongly for a national 
renewables target to be part of the European 2030 package in early 2014. The new 
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government has introduced reforms to reduce some subsidies and spread their costs more 
widely, but planned growth in renewables remains unchanged.2 
 
In the UK, policy took a different course. From 1989, renewable energy was in theory 
eligible for support through an auctioning policy, although in practice very little capacity was 
built (Mitchell and Connor, 2004).  In 2003, a Renewables Obligation (RO) was introduced, 
which placed an obligation on large energy companies to source a certain proportion of 
generation each year from renewables. This created a market for renewables, but with a price 
that was not certain, and one which basically rewarded the cheapest technology (on-shore 
wind). As a result, almost all investment in new renewable energy under the RO was by large 
companies able to bear the price risk, and was concentrated in wind only (Mitchell et al, 
2006). In terms of Figure 6.1 above, while German policies had begun to transform the 
structure of relationships in the sector, breaking down the distinction between providers and 
consumers, UK policy reinforced those structural divisions. A small and badly run grants 
programme supported a trickle of investment in solar PV by households, but this was at a tiny 
level compared with Germany. Eventually, in 2010, a feed-in tariff for small scale renewables 
was introduced, but following explosive growth in solar PV, tariff rates were quickly scaled 
back. Only in 2013 has the desire to reduce risk for larger investors led the UK to finally 
embrace a version of feed-in tariffs more widely. 
 
The policy design of the Renewables Obligation has created weak positive feedback effects, 
and left the growth of renewables in the UK exposed to considerable negative feedback 
effects. Large energy companies have made the largest investment in renewables, but they 
also have existing high-carbon assets, and the companies have been half-hearted advocates 
for renewables at best. Their ambivalence has also affected interest group formation, with one 
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organization (RenewableUK) representing larger companies and another (the Renewable 
Energy Association) the small-scale renewables lobby. During the debate about the 
introduction of a feed-in tariff in the UK, these two groups were unable to agree. The UK has 
also so far failed to develop a strong industrial policy and supply chain for renewable energy, 
meaning that employment effects are nowhere near as politically important as they have been 
in Germany, and that a narrative about the importance of ‘green jobs’ is not yet taken for 
granted. 
 
At the same time, the dominance of large corporate interests in renewables has produced 
stronger negative feedback effects. One issue is planning. Whereas in Germany around half 
of onshore wind turbines were owned by farmers or local cooperatives in the late 1990s, in 
the UK 98 per cent were owned by large energy companies or developers, which have no link 
to or stake in the local society and economy (Pollitt, 2010, p36). Szarka (2006, p3046) argues 
that ‘It is clear from fieldwork contacts with anti-wind protesters in Britain… that one cause 
of rejection is the feeling of injustice engendered by outside firms who exploit a local 
resource and impose burdens, but offer no community benefit or compensation’. Moreover , 
and again in contrast with Germany where tariffs were adjusted to help investors in less 
windy sites, the RO has incentivized developers to seek out the windiest sites, which often 
tend to be in ecologically and visually sensitive areas.  
 
The fact that much of the financial benefit from renewables policy has been captured by large 
energy firms, which have become extremely unpopular since the mid-2000s due to price 
rises, suspected profiteering and high executive salaries, also leaves UK policy particularly 
exposed to the negative feedback effects of cost. Germany’s renewable electricity support 
programme has so far cost about four times what the UK has spent, as a share of national 
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income (OECD, 2013, p48). Despite this, rifts on the future of renewable power in the 
political elite and the media are stronger in the UK – with, for example, proposals to halt and 
even reverse on-shore wind expansion – creating considerable political uncertainty and a 
chilling effect on investment. 
 
Overall, in Germany, renewables policy appears to have maintained a dominance of positive 
over negative feedback effects through spreading the benefits of the policy widely through 
society. Policy-makers, not without controversy, have tried to solve the problem of how to 
manage interests during transformation discussed above not so much by balancing them but 
by beginning to transform energy users into producers and challenging incumbents directly. It 
was not clear that this was intended at the start of the policy, but it has evolved in such a way 
as to produce this outcome. In the UK, by contrasts, policy has benefitted incumbent 
producers, but the problem of balancing this approach with the interests of users has become 
increasingly fraught over time. 
 
India and China 
 
This framework can also be applied in the very different settings of countries like India and 
China. These countries are still at a relatively early stage of transformation in terms of 
renewable power. For example, despite rapid growth (Lewis, 2011; Sharma et al, 2012), wind 
power as the leading technology in both countries still only provided 2.5 per cent of total 
electricity generation in India in 2011 and 1.5 per cent in China. Policy feedback effects are 
likely to be much weaker at this stage. However, both countries also have ambitious targets 
for renewable energy, and the policy feedback approach can help identify how far, and 
where, these ambitions are likely to encounter political problems. 
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Investment in wind power in India has historically been driven by capital subsidies and tax 
incentives, including accelerated depreciation (AD). This policy has drawn in investors from 
a wide range of businesses (who also seek on-site power generation given the unreliability of 
the Indian grid), and also fostered substantial development of wind farms by wind turbine 
manufacturers themselves in a so-called ‘vertically integrated’ model (Benecke, 2011; 
Shrimali, 2014). Interestingly, in terms of Figure 6.1 above, this policy approach means that 
the distinction between energy providers and consumers is again broken down, but unlike as 
in Germany, only for industrial and commercial customers, not for domestic customers, and 
with quite different political effects. Additional support mechanisms have also been 
introduced over the 2000s, including feed-in tariffs at the state level, a ‘generation-based 
incentive’ offered by the central government and a renewables obligation on (largely-state 
owned) electricity companies, but not all of these are functioning particularly effectively 
(Shrimali and Tirumalachetty, 2013).  
 
The cost of feed-in tariffs for wind is incurred by state utilities, and passed on to customers. 
While the relatively small role of wind means that this is not yet a major problem, in some 
states, utilities and regulators have begun to worry about the sustainability of such costs and 
are pressing for a move to an auctioning policy (Kanchan, 2013), which has been successful 
in bringing down generation costs in solar PV (Deshmukh et al, 2011).  
 
At the same time, support via accelerated depreciation has also produced negative feedback 
effects, not so much via electricity consumers as via the federal budget. In theory, this route 
leads ultimately to taxpayers, but the nature of Indian politics means that mechanisms of 
accountability are limited, and the pressure for cuts to support mainly comes from reformist 
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policy-makers themselves. Accelerated depreciation covers other investments in addition to 
wind farms, but overall it is responsible for almost half India’s foregone tax revenue from the 
corporate sector (Bandyopadhyay, 2013), and has come under increasing pressure from a 
government interested in fiscal reform. In 2012, the allowance for wind investments was 
slashed and the generation-based incentive was cut, leading to a sharp slowdown in new 
investment. 3  
 
If wind, and indeed large-scale solar PV investments grow on the scale envisaged by national 
targets for renewables, a further negative feedback effect may arise through competition for 
land. Early so-called solar ‘ultra-mega power plants’ are being sited on government–owned 
land, but clashes over the siting of renewables in farming communities are not unknown, and 
informed observers argue that without benefits for local communities this will be a potential 
problem for the growth of renewables in future.4 
 
Against these negative feedback effects, positive effects are also likely to play some role. 
India has favoured local turbine manufacturing through import duties, although its industrial 
policy for wind has been nowhere nearly as active as China’s (Lewis, 2011). The leading 
turbine manufacturer, Suzlon, estimates that the wind industry is creating around 40,000 jobs 
a year. Also important, as in Germany, will be popular ownership of, or participation in 
renewables, with a large increase in solar PV on domestic roofs anticipated, partly financed 
and/or owned by energy services companies. 
 
China’s wind boom originates from 2003, when the government introduced a policy of 
auctioning opportunities to build wind farms on pre-selected sites, with preferential loans and 
tax conditions, grid access and other infrastructure provided, while at the same time placing 
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obligations on state-owned power generation companies to generate a certain proportion of 
electricity from wind, and on state-owned supply companies to buy a certain proportion of 
electricity from renewable sources (Lema and Ruby, 2007; Lewis, 2011). The approach has 
incentivized a very rapid expansion of investment in wind capacity, with less attention to 
quality. There have been problems with poor turbine performance, lack of grid access and 
poor maintenance, and increasingly frequent incidents of turbine failure (Wang et al, 2012; 
Zhang et al, 2013). From 2009, a feed-in tariff policy was introduced to try to address some 
of these issues. 
 
The key success of China’s policy has been in building up what is now a globally successful 
wind industry through a highly active industrial policy (Lewis, 2011; Wang et al, 2012; Lema 
et al, 2013). This has led to positive feedback effects both through employment (in 2008 an 
estimated 1 million people were employed in the Chinese renewables industry, mostly in 
wind (Li, 2010)), and export earnings. These effects can be expected to grow further if the 
Chinese wind industry can further develop its position and if global wind markets hold up.  
 
As in India, much of the political dynamics of the wind energy boom in China play out 
between large energy companies and policy-makers. At the national level, the state has been 
keen to promote a wind industry which is now a major exporter.  Local governments are 
often keen promoters of smaller wind farms, which do not require state-level approval, 
because they bring tax revenue, provide jobs and help local industry (Zhang et al, 2013, 
p338). Energy companies, meanwhile, have mixed interests. Grid and supply firms have to 
buy wind energy, but to some extent have been allowed to pass costs through to consumers 
and in any case have soft budget constraints as state-owned enterprises. State-owned 
generation companies have invested heavily in wind power, because of the requirement on 
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them to meet their portfolio targets, which affects their ability to obtain permission to build 
more conventional (coal and nuclear) capacity. Such companies own more than 80 per cent of 
China’s wind capacity (Zhang et al, 2013, p338).  
 
The costs of wind and other renewables in China are now financed from a fund set up by a 
surcharge on consumers’ bills (Yuan and Zuo, 2011). The surcharge is still fairly low, but has 
been increased several times since the mid-2000s. In spite of this, the renewables fund is still 
facing shortfalls, and there have as a result been delays in payments to wind developers since 
2010 (Davidson, 2013). The most recent increase to the surcharge has involved a doubling for 
industrial customers but no change for domestic customers, a reverse of the German policy 
by which most industrial users were exempt from such charges. At the same time, feed-in 
tariffs have been somewhat scaled back, especially for solar PV. However, the overall 
political effects of negative cost feedback are likely to be limited. This is because the Chinese 
government sets electricity prices centrally and consumer prices have been kept low, 
including for industrial users (Rutkowski, 2013). 
 
In China then, policy has been kept on track by strong positive feedback via the development 
of wind as industrial policy and by more direct control of energy companies by the state. The 
potential negative feedback effects of costs falling on electricity consumers is likely to 
remain small as long as the state continues to keep power prices low. In effect, in terms of 
Figure 6.1 above, the Chinese state is using its huge fiscal resources to act as a buffer 
between providers and users. 
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The role of institutional context 
 
Diversity in social and economic institutional systems 
 
In addition to the nature of policies themselves, we might also expect the wider discursive, 
institutional and political context in which policies are made and implemented to also have an 
influence (Pierson, 1993, p602, Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009, p3). As discussed above, it is 
these contexts that determine the exact nature of the structural relationships between energy 
providers, users and policy-makers (see Figure 6.1 above) in different countries. 
 
First, the range of options for policy design which are acceptable in any particular context 
will to a great extent be prescribed by what are sometimes called ‘policy paradigms’, i.e. 
interpretive frameworks of ideas and standards that are ‘embedded in the very terminology 
through which policy-makers communicate about their work… influential precisely because 
so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole’ (Hall, 1993, p279). 
Particular policy paradigms are in turn often associated with particular institutional systems. 
For example, Schmidt (2002) argues that in Britain policy has been dominated by a neo-
liberal paradigm, linked to a liberalized market institutional system and a politics deeply 
influenced by Thatcherism. By contrast, Germany’s distinctive ‘social market’ paradigm 
complements a set of more deliberative economic institutions, while France’s paradigm of 
dirigisme is a good fit for an institutional system in which the state plays a prominent role. 
 
Beyond policy design, institutional systems may also influence the articulation of policies 
and political effects, i.e. how far positive and negative feedback effects are likely to arise, and 
whether these effects are amplified or dampened. Many policies for green transformation are 
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essentially economic policies, involving taxes, subsidies and other forms of state or 
institutional support, so economic institutions are particularly important. For example, a 
renewable energy support policy can offer a subsidy, but how far investment in renewables 
actually takes place depends on how far financial institutions complement that policy and 
provide credit on acceptable terms. Equally, a country with labour market and welfare 
systems that produce high levels of poverty and inequality may find it hard to place the costs 
of renewable energy support on energy bills, as it this amplifies the political effects of a 
negative policy feedback to the point of crisis. 
 
The importance of context for policy feedback effects suggests that differences in speeds and 
paths of green transformation in different countries may be related to institutional diversity 
across countries. There are many approaches to understanding such institutional diversity (see 
e.g. Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Schmidt, 2002; Morgan et al, 2010), and considerable debate 
over whether it is possible to classify countries into particular ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Crouch, 2005a; Hancké et al, 2007) or the relevance of those models for 
countries outside of Europe (Carney et al, 2009; Schneider, 2009). However, common to all 
these approaches is the idea that different countries do have distinctive systems of social and 
economic institutions that complement one another, and which evolve over time (Crouch, 
2005b, Streeck and Thelen, 2005). We can therefore expect such systems to have significant 
implications for the speed and path of a green transformation. 
 
Germany and the UK 
 
Returning to the cases of Germany and the UK, there are several contrasts in institutions and 
discourses that may help explain why Germany adopted a policy which had the potential to 
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create stronger positive feedback effects, and also why that potential was realized more 
fully.5 
 
The Renewables Obligation (RO) was chosen in the UK explicitly as a mechanism that 
attempted to mimic a market, i.e. not setting a fixed price, and avoided an explicit 
technology-specific focus, and seen as superior to the German feed-in tariff specifically for 
these reasons. This approach was entirely consistent with a policy-making environment in the 
UK dominated by a neo-classical, and often neo-liberal, economic paradigm. In Germany, the 
neo-liberally minded finance ministry was also opposed to a technology-specific feed-in 
tariff. However, the wider German policy paradigm was more influenced by the concept of 
‘Ordoliberalism’, a social market approach developed in Germany after the Second World 
War which laid much greater emphasis on active government intervention to ensure 
competition and prevent monopolistic or oligopolistic market power (Toke and Lauber, 
2007). 
 
Ordoliberalism also turned out to be far more consistent with the idea of an active industrial 
policy – and therefore a mission-oriented green industrial policy (see Mazzucato, chapter 9) – 
than the UK’s policy paradigm. In the UK, governments since the 1970s have largely been 
sceptical of any directed form of industrial policy, with the Treasury in particular a major 
opponent. More widely, many comparative analyses of economic institutions lay emphasis on 
the much greater degree of coordination amongst industrial companies and the state in 
Germany compared with the UK (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2002).  
 
Other aspects of Germany’s institutions have also turned out to play important roles in 
facilitating both the implementation of its renewable policy, and in increasing its net positive 
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political feedback effects. Much of the investment by non-corporate actors in renewables has 
been supported by state finance in the form of the KfW bank, channelled through a network 
of local and regional banks, which know their clients personally. The UK has no equivalent 
financial institutions.  
 
In Germany, higher energy costs for consumers have not produced quite the same political 
backlash as in the UK partly because higher levels of welfare and lower inequality in 
Germany make fuel poverty and squeezed incomes in the middle less acute problems (Crepaz 
1998; Iversen and Soskice, 2006). 
 
Below the level of national political economy, German federalism and decentralization has 
also meant that municipalism is strong, at least compared with the UK’s currently highly 
centralized system. Both municipal and regional government in Germany have been highly 
supportive of various aspects of renewables growth, and many municipalities in Germany 
still own energy supply and generation businesses that have given them a vehicle for 
investment. In the UK, such companies disappeared after the Second World War.  
 
India and China 
 
In the case of India and China, there are similarities as well as differences in institutional 
context, which partly explains why they initially adopted similar support policies for wind 
that focused on capital costs and directed subsidy towards those institutions that play a 
leading role in their respective political economies – state-owned enterprises in China and 
family-owned corporations in India (e.g. Taylor and Nölke, 2008). Both countries have also 
historically embraced significant state intervention on the economy (although China to a 
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greater extent than India), including active industrial policy. Chinese provinces and many 
Indian states also have state-owned energy utilities with soft budget constraints, a situation 
which has given policy-makers more room for manoeuvre in the balance between providers 
and users, and has also softened negative policy feedback that might work through private 
sector incumbents. 
 
However, one key difference between the two countries that helps explain why the pace of 
wind expansion is currently faltering in India and not in China is the unwillingness of policy-
makers in India’s central government to continue to subsidize wind via accelerated 
depreciation. This unwillingness can be explained in part by the policy paradigm of the 
current Indian government led until 2014 by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has 
pursued a series of reforms over the last decade aimed at liberalization, tax simplification and 
fiscal consolidation clearly influenced by the ideas of orthodox economics. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
What constitutes a green transformation will be open to contestation, but for any kind of 
transformation actually to occur it must be politically sustainable. Alliances for 
transformations need not only to be formed but also maintained and expanded. In this sense, 
if policies (or actions or campaigns by social movements) are to be successful in bringing 
about green transformations, they must be self-reinforcing, creating constituencies for their 
own implementation and expansion.  
 
In terms of the concepts explored here, this means that policies must have a preponderance of 
positive feedback effects over negative ones if they are to become ‘locked in’. For many 
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sustainability problems, including climate change, this represents a major challenge, since 
transformative policies fly in the face of existing high-carbon lock-in, and will challenge 
existing vested interests, norms and institutions. In that sense, policies for green 
transformations are always likely to encounter negative feedback. 
 
Here I have argued that an important factor in the balance between positive and negative 
feedback effects is the design of policies, using a number of comparative case studies. For 
example, Germany’s policy approach has been to distribute subsidies from policy relatively 
widely, and use industrial policy to create employment, both of which have created important 
positive feedback effects to offset the inevitable negative feedback on the costs of the policy. 
This is not so much a case of grassroots innovation from below (see Smith and Ely, chapter 
7) as mass appropriation of innovation from above. The UK’s renewable support mechanism 
has done neither of these things, leaving subsidy to be captured by large and highly unpopular 
energy incumbents and the policy exposed.  
 
I have also argued that both policy design and political effects in turn will depend in part on 
institutional systems and dominant policy paradigms present in a country. Again, taking the 
contrast between the UK and Germany, a technology-neutral, market-mimicking policy was 
the natural fit for the liberal policy paradigm in the former case, whereas an industrial policy 
for renewables was very difficult to get going, in contrast to Germany’s more managed, 
coordinated institutional system and discourse. 
 
Most of the analysis in this paper focuses on two sets of comparisons, one between Germany 
and the UK and another between China and India. However, it is also worth briefly 
considering what can be learned from comparing Asia with Europe. The first region has fast 
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growing rising powers with young populations, whereas the second is now economically 
sclerotic and fiscally constrained. This implies that, for a number of reasons, we might expect 
renewable energy policy to have a greater degree of political sustainability in the Asian 
countries, especially China. The Chinese state has deep pockets, which enables it to limit the 
negative feedback arising from costs to consumers. Both India and China can expect to create 
exporting industries in renewable energy on a greater scale, certainly than the UK. Both are at 
a much earlier stage of mass deployment. However, they could still learn from the different 
experiences of Germany and the UK, and be aware of both the political opportunities and 
potential traps that arise from policy design. 
 
What are the lessons from this approach, if any, for accelerating green transformations? One 
is simply that climate policy-making, which is dominated by economics, should include more 
consideration of the political implications of policy. To some extent, policy-makers already 
do this in a self-censoring way, avoiding policies that they think will be too controversial 
with some groups, but they rarely think about deliberate strategies for positive feedback. In 
this sense, we should learn from the German experience. The creation of positive feedback 
effects in renewable energy policy in Germany was not an initially explicit aim; rather, this 
aspect emerged as an unintended consequence of policy design. But this does not mean that 
feedback aspects of policy should not be thought about from the start; indeed there is 
precisely an opportunity to do so. As the political dynamics of policy unfold over time, a 
strategy of adaptive management may also be important; responding to opportunities for 
positive feedback, or the threats of negative feedback as they arise. To some extent, the 
German case again provides a fairly successful example of this. 
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A second implication is that countries with institutions that are less supportive of positive 
feedback effects should seek to change their institutions or develop new ones. This is a 
controversial area, with some arguing that institutional systems cannot be changed and others 
that they can. The key thing seems to be that what matters for learning from others is 
institutional function rather than form. 
 
Finally, the approach taken here also throws some light on the relationships between social 
justice and green transformations. Policies which spread the benefits of transformations more 
widely, for example, Germany’s employment in renewable supply chains in the deprived 
north and east of the country, are likely to produce valuable positive feedback effects and be 
more sustainable. A different perspective on the issue is to pose the question the other way 
round, i.e. does greater social justice make green transformation easier? Again, the 
experience of Germany and the UK would suggest that it does, because the better off are the 
poorest in society, the more able they are to bear some part of the costs of transformation, and 
able to claim some share of the benefits. 
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Notes
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Carlota Perez, Hubert Schmitz and to the other contributors to this book for comments on 
earlier drafts and to Ashwin Gambhir for discussions on India’s wind energy policies. The framework used here 
for analysing the politics of energy was jointly developed with Caroline Kuzemko, Catherine Mitchell and 
Richard Hoggett. This work was supported by The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) [EP/K001582/1]. 
2 www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/04/germany%E2%80%99s-renewables-reforms-are-a-step-towards-giving-
energy-sector-back-to-big-corporations/, accessed 16 June 2014  
3 www.business-standard.com/article/companies/restore-accelerated-depreciation-scheme-for-wind-sector-
suzlon-114020900114_1.html, accessed 16 June 2014  
4 Personal communication, Ashwin Gambhir, PRAYAS 
5 See also Laird and Stefes (2009) for a similar analysis of Germany and the US. 
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